A Theory of Menu Federalism: Decentralization by Political Agreement

This paper analyzes agreements between governments that determine the division of policy-making power between central and regional governments. Our analysis demonstrates that initial circumstances and political risks affect the degree of centralization that will be adopted, and that asymmetric forms of federalism are often consequences of ongoing negotiations between regional and central governments over the assignment of policy-making authority. We analyze three settings where gains from constitutional exchange may exist: (i) the under-centralized state, (ii) the over-centralized state, and (iii) the constitutional convention. In each case, an asymmetric form of federalism is the predicted outcome, although the degree of asymmetry differs according to starting point. Modern and historical examples are used to illustrate the relevance of our analysis.     

The temporal relationship between derivatives trading and spot market volatility in the U.K.: Empirical analysis and Monte Carlo evidence

This article examines empirically the dynamic relationship between spot market volatility, futures trading, and options trading in the context of a trivariate simultaneous equations model. The empirical analysis provides strong evidence that significant simultaneity, in addition to feedback, characterizes the relationship between the proxy for time-varying spot market volatility and derivative trading. Also, futures trading and options trading are found to affect spot market volatility in opposite directions in the structural model proposed. The results, corroborated by Monte Carlo evidence, suggest that the failure to account for any contemporaneous interaction between the variables under consideration, as well as the omission of any of the two derivatives trading activities examined in this study, may generate serious misspecification and ultimately produce misleading estimation results and statistical inference. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 19: 245–270, 1999     

Regional Disparities and Government Quality: Redistributive Conflict Crowds Out Good Government

Abstract

In this paper, we argue and provide empirical evidence to support the claim that higher income differences across regions increase the salience of interregional redistribution and, as a result, crowd out policies aiming towards improvements in government quality or efficiency. In the presence of greater regional disparities, the balance of politics may tilt towards redistributive concerns and away from government efficiency considerations, especially since the latter can be opposed by organized public sector interest groups. Our empirical analysis, based on a sample of 22 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries over the period from the mid-1990s to 2005, supports our basic intuition that regional disparities may lead to territorially based redistributive conflict to the detriment of government quality.     

Financial Integration in the GCC Region: Market Size Versus National Effects

Open Economies Review - This paper examines financial spillovers between the four largest equity markets (by market capitalization) in the GCC region using a VAR-GARCH (1,1) framework that sheds...     

Intrinsic Motivation and the Logic of Collective Action: The Impact of Selective Incentives

I integrate the notion of intrinsic motivation, applied to economics most notably by Frey (1997 ), into the logic of individual contributions toward collective goods as analyzed since Olson ([1965] 1971 ). This illuminates the many and various ways through which the intrinsic motivation to contribute toward such goods can be crowded out by the application of selective incentives. I suggest that the crowding‐out effect increases the cost to society of organizing the provision of collective goods and argue in favor of designing selective incentives that mitigate this effect.     

Fiscal decentralization and government quality in the OECD

Using indicators of fiscal decentralization which control for intergovernmental transfers and grants, it is shown that decentralization has a positive impact on government quality but that this positive effect is mitigated in the presence of regional elections and multi-level government.     

Rolling settlement and market liquidity

This paper investigates the impact on UK stock and option markets of the change from an account based settlement system to a rolling settlement procedure. Such a change increases the transaction costs of short-term margin traders, and is likely to impact on the liquidity of the underlying market, as well as trading in the options market. Evidence is presented that the settlement procedure does impact on the liquidity of the market. Further, we find that rolling settlement increased market liquidity, consistent with the exit of margin traders as a result of the increase in short selling costs. Associated with this increase in liquidity is a significant reduction in nonoptionable stock trading volume, implying that margin trading may have been more prevalent in stocks without options. Finally, it is shown that while trading in stock options increased, the volatilities implied from call and put option prices indicate that put options have become relatively more expensive. This reflects the change in demand induced by the new settlement procedure, especially in terms of the increase in short selling costs.     

A Rejoinder to ‘Professionalizing Claims and the State of UK Professional Accounting Education: Some Evidence’

Abstract

In response to the nine Commentaries on our original paper (Sikka et al., this issue Sikka, P. this issue. Professionalizing claims and the state of UK professional accounting education: some evidence. Accounting Education: an international journal, 16(1): 3–21.  [Google Scholar]), this Rejoinder responds to two themes: the politics of professional education, and accounting ethics. We argue that the contents of accounting education are shaped by a particular kind of politics, which privileges technicist rationality. In addition, we pose some questions about the accountancy profession's claims to be advancing ethical conduct by briefly focusing upon its own domestic and foreign interventions.     

Rationality, Ethnicity And Institutions: A Survey Of Issues And Results

Abstract.  This paper focuses on the relationship between institutions and ethnocentrism as discussed in the rational choice literature. The institutional environment can influence both the formation and the expression of ethnic tastes by rational individuals. Ethnocentrism is likely to be mitigated by, on the one hand, a private sector characterized by a wide and competitive market with effective property right and antitrust law enforcement provided by non-ethnic institutions and, on the other hand, a public sector which is characterized by institutional restrictions on the differential fiscal or regulatory treatment on the basis of ethnicity, a redistributive system based on non-ethnic criteria and finally, the possibility for decentralized collective decision making. These insights may be of particular utility when designing the institutions of potentially divided multi-ethnic states.     

Ethnic segregation and the quality of government: the importance of regional diversity

It has recently been argued that the regional segregation of ethnic or linguistic groups leads to lower government quality and that this is partly due to the negative effect of segregation on inter-group trust. In this paper I show that the relationship between ethnic segregation, trust and government quality is mediated by another dimension of regional diversity namely, regional income disparities. Accounting for regional disparities reduces the estimated impact of segregation and trust on the quality of government and reduces the statistical robustness of ethnic segregation. The analysis highlights the usefulness of identifying other factors which may be driving regional diversity, beyond ethno-linguistic characteristics.